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Abstract. The objective of this research is to examine the relationship between signals 
including governance and management practices and the performance of family firms 
IPOs. Using IPO data of 129 family firms and 129 comparable non-family firms from 
the Taiwan Stock Exchange, our findings highlighted the role of non-family insiders, or 
non-family affiliated directors in the IPOs of family firms. Our comparison between fam-
ily and non-family IPOs shows hiring prestigious underwriters significantly improves the 
performance of family firm IPOs. Finally, we found the industries of IPO firms moderate 
the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and IPO performances, as 
non-family firms in technology industries are perceived to be more legitimate than their 
family counterparts. This paper makes three contributions to existing research. Firstly, we 
contribute to the legitimacy theory by suggesting an interaction effect between internal 
(organizational) and external (environmental) factors. Secondly, our analysis highlighted 
the roles of affiliated directors and industry in the performances of public family firms. 
Thirdly, this study contributes to the family business research by underscoring the differ-
ences between family and non-family firms in the IPO context. 
Keywords: legitimacy, signaling, family ownership, family firms, Taiwan, initial public 
offering. 
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1. Introduction
Family firms are business organizations managed or controlled by one or more fami-
lies. This structure minimizes the principal-agent problem highlighted in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). However public family firms, like other public corporations, need to 
attend to shareholder value and investors’ perceptions by demonstrating their “fitness to 
financial markets” (Davis 2005), because the integration of ownership and management 
gives the family owners great power to reap private benefits from the firm by expropri-
ating minority shareholders (La Porta et al. 2000). Family firms fail to demonstrate its 
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market fitness would lose their legitimacy and suffer from equity undervaluation, which 
makes the family owner vulnerable to lose control of its business. 
Legitimacy is the external stakeholders’ perception about how well an organization 
meets expectations (Singh et al. 1986; Suchman 1995). This perception plays a central 
role in investors’ evaluation of equity quality (Zuckerman 1999, 2000; Sun, Tobin 2005; 
Bell et al. 2008). Establishing social acceptance or legitimacy in the capital market is 
a challenging task for a family firm offering its equities to the public for the first time. 
Because the initial public offering (IPO) firms are relatively unknown to investors (Rao 
1994; Rao, Chandy, Prabhu 2008), potential investors have limited means to examine 
the track record of the IPO firms but to rely on information from the prospectuses. 
This accentuates the importance of signaling (Shapiro 1983). Many empirical analyses 
have confirmed the positive impacts of select corporate governance and management 
practices in IPO signaling, including but not limited to board independence, post-IPO 
shares retaining, and underwriter reputation (Burton et al. 2004). Effective signals ad-
dresses investor’s concerns associated with the idiosyncratic organizational (internal) 
and environmental (external) conditions of firms and therefore the contents and effects 
of signaling can be different from one organization to another (Zajac, Westphal 1994; 
Ward et al. 2009). 
In the IPO market, board independence and share retaining are examples of universally 
desirable governance signals to potential investors. However, in addition to the insider 
and outsider directors frequently analyzed in governance studies, the non-family execu-
tive directors constitute a third category of board of directors. For the sake of conveni-
ence, we label these individuals as “affiliated directors.” They are professional manag-
ers, corporate insiders, very often friends of the controlling family, and even business 
partners. But these managers are often considered “not part of family” to the family 
owners (Esteban et al. 2011)1. Although non-family managers play an important role in 
professionalizing family firms and are instrumental to the long-term success of family 
firms (Schulze et al. 2001), there has been little discussion about principal-principal 
agency problem and IPO performance implication of these non-family affiliated direc-
tors.
On the account of external conditions, we propose that industry as an external moderat-
ing factor between organizational policies such as governance and management prac-
tices and their relationship with IPO performance. Family firms and non-family firms 
have different behavioral patterns because the former group’s governance and manage-
ment decisions need to incorporate the interest of family (Habbershon et al. 2003). The 
behavioral uniqueness may be more acceptable or even desirable in some industries but 
may be less desirable in other industries. For example, a strong family identity usually 
enhances the performances of family firms in service industries (Craig et al. 2008). The 
extant literature shows the public generally perceives that family firms are different 
from non-family firms. However, the impact of such a perceptive differential on the 
equity market performance is largely unknown.
1 All of the affiliated directors in our sample are employees.
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This research suggests that a family firm can improve its IPO performance using gov-
ernance practices and managerial decisions as signals. While some of these signals are 
universally accepted and expected by investors, others are unique to family firms. A 
family firm IPO meeting these expectations enjoys better IPO performances, measured 
by underpricing – the difference between the offer price and the closing price of an 
IPO. We examine the effects of signaling in legitimacy building by testing the impacts 
of select governance and management signals on underpricing. Our analysis on family 
firm IPO makes three contributions to the existing research. Firstly, we contribute to the 
legitimacy theory by suggesting an interaction effect between organizational (internal) 
and environmental (external) factors. Secondly, our analysis highlights the roles of af-
filiated directors and the industry in the performances of public family firms. Thirdly, 
this study contributes to the family business research by underscoring the differences 
between family and non-family firms in the IPO context. We proceed as follows. First, 
we review the relevant literature and present hypotheses. Next, we describe the meth-
odology and report our analytical results. We conclude with a discussion of our research 
implications for research on corporate governance, family business and IPO research.
2. Legitimacy and signaling
Legitimacy of a business is determined by how well this organization is accepted by its 
investors. This social acceptance is an organization’s “precondition to compete” (Pfef-
fer, Salancik 1978) or “license to operate” in the market (Chiu, Sharfman 2011). In the 
capital market, investors reward the legitimate family firms by paying premium prices 
to acquire equities of these organizations (Sun, Tobin 2005; Bell et al. 2008; Bédard 
et al. 2008), because investors would take an ‘illegitimacy discount’ in the valuation of 
equities offered by firms with lower legitimacy (Zuckerman 1999, 2000). 
When the market is perfectly efficient, investors would have sufficient information to 
assess the businesses. Therefore, better businesses enjoy better social acceptance or 
legitimacy. Nevertheless, when the market is not perfectly efficient, good family busi-
nesses will be motivated to signal investors to establish better legitimacy against inferior 
family businesses. According to Spence’s signaling theory (1973, 2002), inferior actors 
in any market has little incentive to invest in signaling to stand out in competition. As 
investors have little information to differentiate high quality to lesser quality equities, 
all of the competing equities will be treated similarly. In short, lesser quality firms are 
free riding. However, good quality firms would be very motivated to stand out among 
peers because investors are willing to pay premium prices for equities issued by quality 
firms. Considering legitimacy as a quality indication, the family firms whose business 
fits investors mental model of good businesses will be able to enjoy higher legitimacy 
than other family firms in the capital market. In the context of family firms IPO, good 
family firms can differentiate from lesser quality family firms through signaling (Leland, 
Pye 1977).
Despite IPO issuer’s efforts to produce positive signals with good governance mecha-
nisms, the processing and interpretation of these signals is a subjective process. When 
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an investor contemplates the legitimacy of a firm, he/she creates an image of an or-
ganization then applying behaviors and traits of this organization to the social norms 
embedded in this socially constructed image to see if these behaviors and traits of the 
focal firm are in agreement with the norms (DiMaggio 1991). In the context of IPO, 
a norm can be viewed as investors’ general idea about what a good IPO firm “should 
do”. These expectations form a mental model of a legitimate IPO firm. An IPO issuer 
not fitting this mental mold creates uncertainty in the valuation of the equity and may 
be rejected or under-valued by the potential investors.
Empirical studies have confirmed the positive effects of signaling in IPO (Leland, Pye 
1977; Beatty, Ritter 1986; Filatotchev, Bishop 2002). These findings generally support 
the notion that IPO firms with better growth potential can communicate with their 
potential investors by clearly articulating their superior quality to investors in various 
channels of disclosures such as SEC filings, news releases, and road shows. For ex-
ample, firms reporting above average financial performances are more likely to enjoy 
growth in stock prices because good financial performances improve corporate reputa-
tion (Fombrun, Shanley 1990; Shrivastava et al. 1997). However, it is not too difficult 
for lesser quality IPO issuers to prepare nice presentations using the same channels 
of communication to blur the distinction between high quality and low quality IPOs. 
Therefore, many IPO firms have adopted select governance and management practices 
to win acceptance from their potential investors (Daily et al. 2003) as the practices are 
more difficult and costly for lesser quality IPOs to imitate. Examples of these signals 
include organizational commitment to social responsibilities (Fombrun, Gardberg, Bar-
nett 2000), high institutional ownership (Fombrun, Shanley 1990), and organizational 
downsizing (Lee 1997). In addition, changing the name of a company to DotCom im-
plies a major strategic switch to a high risk, high growth business model (Lee 2001). 
In summary, governance and management practices can be used as signals for an IPO 
firm to establish social acceptance (i.e. legitimacy) among its investors. 
3. Family firm IPO performance
The active participation of management by family shareholders has profound influence 
to the behaviors and value of these firms (Litz 2008). Family business literature has 
constantly found that family firms are long-term oriented and are more conservative 
than non-family firms (Westhead, Howorth 2006; Naldi et al. 2007; Litz 2008). Such 
behavioral traits reflect the family owners’ propensity to maintain the legacy of their 
families and to create a source of long-term, stable family income (Naldi et al. 2007). 
In order to control the firm, the family owners can adopt a number of control mecha-
nisms including pyramid ownership, voting agreement to pool family shareholders, 
board overrepresentation, and dual-class stocks (Villalonga, Amit 2006). Without suf-
ficient checks and balances of family owners’ power in the corporate board, minority 
shareholders have limited means to prevent potential expropriation.
Building on the signaling theory and legitimacy theory, we argue that a good family 
firm in the IPO market would be motivated to differentiate itself from others through 
signaling. One of the major governance mechanisms to manage this principal-principal 
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problem is the composition of the corporate board. The appointment of independent di-
rectors, who are not affiliated with the firm or a member of the family, on the corporate 
board improves the oversight and reduces the information asymmetry between majority 
and minority shareholders in public family firms (Anderson, Reeb 2004). High percent-
age of independent directors on the board also increases the overall performance of the 
family firms (Anderson, Reeb 2004; Anderson, Mansi, Reeb 2004) as these outsiders 
bring in needed new resources and knowledge to manage the family firm (Anderson, 
Reeb 2004). In many cases, IPO firms recruit highly experienced and respected indi-
viduals to serve on their boards. The appointment of these highly qualified directors 
also represents a symbolic action of good governance to secure investor confidence 
and acceptance (Jenkinson, Ljungqvist 2002; Certo 2003; Li, Naughton 2007; Shekhar, 
Stapledon 2007). 
As establishing sufficient shareholder protection is essential when a firm offers equi-
ties through the IPO process (Baker, Gompers 2003; Shekhar, Stapledon 2007), board 
independence signals to the potential investors that there are adequate protections of 
minority shareholder interests and/or the company is under control by highly qualified 
individuals (Luan, Tang 2007). Given the dominant influence of family shareholders 
in family firms, the appointment of outside, non-family board members is particularly 
significant to the protection of minority shareholders’ interests. This practice is in line 
with investors’ perception of good governance practice and can enhance the acceptance, 
legitimacy, of the family firm. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H1: High percentage of outside non-family directors on the corporate board improves 
the IPO performance of a family firm.
While the outside independent directors are generally considered as a governance 
mechanism to improve the effectiveness of monitoring, the role of non-family execu-
tive directors in the board of directors is more complicated. Non-family executives are 
corporate insiders. As employees of the family firms, the appointments of these affiliated 
directors on the corporate board can be the family owners’ tactic to control the board 
through a dominant coalition to control the family business after IPO. Because of such 
affiliation, the conventional view of board independence suggests that these affiliated 
directors are less effective in safeguarding the interests of non-family shareholders than 
external, independent directors (Anderson, Reeb 2004). The appointment of affiliated 
directors reduces the effectiveness of the corporate board. Therefore, the percentage of 
affiliated directors on the board is likely to be positively correlated with the underpric-
ing of a family firm IPO. 
However, unlike external, independent directors, working for the same company pro-
vides a platform of communication and collaboration for the affiliated directors to ef-
fectively fulfill their director duties. Several studies have suggested that the lack of 
organizational knowledge and time hinders the effectiveness of corporate boards (Kim, 
Cannella 2008; Payne et al. 2009; Conger, Lawler 2009). The ineffectiveness of the 
board is likely to have negative impact on the investors’ acceptance. We argue that the 
inclusion of non-family, affiliated directors could mitigate the knowledge and time prob-
lems. Firstly, affiliated directors are professional managers and often long-term employ-
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ees. They possess good knowledge about their organizations, including the institutional 
norms, power dynamics, organizational culture, core values, product, and market. Their 
knowledge also makes them expert directors (McDonald, Westphal, Graebner 2008) 
who are able to assist other less knowledgeable board members. In addition, the superior 
knowledge of corporate insiders enables them to better influence the strategic decisions 
of the firm (Bathala, Rao 1995). Secondly, since board members as a group spends 
relatively little time together, corporate insiders’ affiliation with the firm allows them 
to work effectively between meetings on issues that concern the board. For example, 
an affiliated director who is appointed for his/her expertise in technology can assist the 
board to be more informed about the marketing strategy and challenges of the firm by 
talking to colleagues in the marketing departments between board meetings. 
Since the appointment of affiliated directors weakens protection of minority shareholder 
interests in the board of family firms, there should be a negative correlation between 
board effectiveness and the influence of affiliated directors on the board. However, the 
non-family, affiliated directors also improve the team effectiveness of the board when a 
significant percentage of directorship is occupied by these corporate insiders. Therefore 
the board of directors is most effective when there is high or low percentage of affiliated 
directors on the board; least effective when their numbers are not enough to improve 
the team effectiveness. 
H1a: There is a curve relationship between the percentage of non-family affiliated di-
rectors in corporate board and performance of a family firm IPO. This curve 
will appear to be an inverse U-shape using underpricing as the measure of IPO 
performance. 
Share retention is another influential signal to attain legitimacy. As high percentage of 
share retaining is more likely to bond the family wealth to the future performance of the 
firm, the percentage of shares retained by the owners becomes an indication of owners’ 
commitment to their firms after IPO (Leland, Pyle 1977; Certo et al. 2001). The more 
the post-IPO shareholding, the higher the cost imposed on owners from the decline of 
firm value (Jensen, Meckling 1976). A higher percentage of family share ownership 
at IPO suggests an alignment of interests between family owners and the investors 
(Bruton, Chahine, Filatochev 2009; Chahine, Tohmé 2009), mitigating the principal-
principal agency problem. Since family firm owners have more information about the 
true value and potential of their companies than investors, family owners’ willingness 
to retain large percentage of shares at IPO signals their confidence in the future prospect 
of the firm (Leland, Pyle 1977; Downes, Heinkel 1982; Clarkson et al. 1991). In short, 
family insiders’ retained equity at IPO is an indication of original shareholders’ level 
of confidence to their own companies. Such confidence helps reduce aftermarket inves-
tors’ uncertainty (Certo et al. 2001), while increasing investor acceptance. We therefore 
predict the following:
H2: The higher the percentage of shares retained by family owners at IPO, the better 
the family firm IPO performance.
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In addition to the characteristics of the board and ownership, underwriter reputation 
is also a major factor in attaining investors’ acceptance. Underwriters are investment 
bankers hired by IPO firms to promote and sell the offering equities. They assist issuers 
to satisfy legal requirements of IPO by closely monitoring issuers’ pre-IPO and post-
IPO activities. Low quality works in IPO preparation would tarnish the reputation of 
underwriters. However, some underwriters are more capable than others in identifying 
the fair price of IPO stocks by, for example, uncovering hidden assets or other variable 
factors in the issuer. These more capable investment bankers enjoy higher prestige than 
their peers in the underwriting industry. Partnering with these high prestige underwriters 
sends a positive signal about the quality of the firm to the market (Beatty, Ritter 1986). 
The benefits derived from hiring prestigious underwriters could be particularly evident 
in family firm IPOs for several reasons. Firstly, equity pricing is always a challenging 
task. However, pricing the equities of a family firm may be more difficult because of 
the complexities associated with the managerial and governing involvement of multiple 
family members in the firm. Secondly, while many view a privately-owned family firm 
as a family legacy, the family owners’ commitment to the firm may be different after 
their shares are diluted through the IPO process. Thirdly, the family owners’ intent to 
pass the business to a younger family member may have significant impact on the value 
of the firm. Fourthly, since family firms are far less transparent than other public firms 
(Anderson, Duru, Reeb 2009), pricing family IPOs is more challenging. As prestigious 
investment bankers are more capable of resolving information asymmetries between 
issuers and investors than others (Carter, Manaster 1990; Carter, Dark, Singh 1998), 
hiring prestigious underwriters certifies the information disclosed by the IPO issuers in 
the prospectus and other means of investor communications.
In summary, hiring a prestigious underwriter may have a stronger effect in reducing 
family firm IPO uncertainty than in non-family IPOs, suggesting a stronger positive 
impact on legitimacy improvement in family firm IPO s than in non-family firm IPOs.
H3: Prestigious underwriters improve the performance of both family and non-family 
firm IPOs. This effect is greater in family firms.
In addition to management and governance practices, an IPO firm’s choice of industry 
can also be a key factor in how well an IPO firm fits investors’ mental model. A firm will 
have greater difficulty to attain social acceptance from potential investors’ if it operates 
in multiple industries. According to Zuckerman (2000), diversified corporation can be 
perceived as less legitimate than another firm concentrating its operations in one indus-
try because investors have greater difficulty to compare them to a standardized mental 
model for the former. Similarly, it will not be easy to establish legitimacy if a firm’s 
behaviors are unique to its peers in the same industry. In both situations, the “difficulty 
to evaluate” reduces the legitimacy of a firm.
Family firms are common in many industries, but they are much less prevalent in tech-
nology industries. The MassMutual American Family Business Survey (2002) reports 
that more than 64% of survey respondents operate in the manufacturing, wholesale, 
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and retail industries. Other industries represented in this survey, including agriculture/
forestry, financial services, high technology/biotechnology, mining/oil and gas, real 
estate, telecommunications and transportation, account for about 35% of survey par-
ticipants. Despite strong emphasis on the growth in profit (The MassMutual American 
Family Business Survey 2002), most family firms have little growth opportunities or 
are reluctant to face the challenges of fast growth organizations (Erven 1998). Although 
venerable family firms such as Corning Inc. have made extensive efforts to develop 
and perfect high risk, high reward technologies, the results of the MassMutual survey 
is in agreement with the findings of previous studies which profile family firms as 
risk averse, long-term oriented organizations (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007). The image of 
family firms is found to be more compatible to service industries than other industries 
(Craig et al. 2008). 
On the other hand, technology-based industries are often characterized as high risk and 
high reward (Coates 2005). High performing innovative firms in technology industries 
tend to encourage their employees to take risk (Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland 1990). Since 
family firms and technology-based firms have very different organizational traits, in-
vestors who are interested in investing a technology-based family firm would find two 
conflicting organizational traits co-existing in these organizations. Such inconsistency 
decreases the legitimacy of family firms as a technology firm. Therefore we hypothesize 
that the IPO firms operating in the technology industry has a moderating effect in the 
relation between the governance signals of family firms and their IPO performances:
H4: Except hypothesis H1a, the relationships hypothesized in H1~3 are weaker when 
the family firm operates in the technology-based industries.
4. Sample selection
We tested our hypotheses using Taiwanese public firms, because public companies in 
Taiwan are mandated by law to disclose the family relationship among member of top 
management team, corporate board, and major shareholders, which is defined as indi-
viduals or institutions holding more than 5% shares OR the top ten largest shareholders 
of a firm (Financial Supervisory Commission 2007). With this exception, the disclosure 
requirement for initial public offerings in Taiwan is similar to that of the SEC filing 
requirement in the United States. The electronic forms of these disclosures are acces-
sible to the public from the Market Information Post System maintained by the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange Corporation. 
In this research, we identify family firms following the two similar criteria adopted by 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Villalonga and Amit (2006). Firstly, a firm is controlled 
by the members of the founding family, which includes the decedents of the original 
founders. Secondly, a family is in control of a family firm when two or more members 
of the family serve on the board or the top management team. On average, family mem-
bers in our family firm sample occupy 29% of the board membership. We identified 
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1292 family firms profiled in the 2005 Business Groups in Taiwan (published in 2006). 
This publication profiles the largest 250 Taiwan-based business groups in terms of total 
assets on an annual basis. Our emphasis on larger organizations was similar to previous 
research focusing on family firms indexed by the S&P 500 (Anderson, Reeb 2003; Vil-
lalonga, Amit 2006). The 129 family firms we identified went public between 1962 and 
2005 in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. We were able to obtain the IPO characteristics data 
of these family firms from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Global New Issues 
database. Post-IPO stock prices were collected from the Datastream and we compared 
them with those provided in the SDC. We collected cash and equivalents from both the 
SDC and the Worldscope. Firm age was the difference between founded and IPO dates, 
which we collected from the SDC and company’s website. The corporate governance 
data was obtained from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ).
Our close examination of the SDC database revealed several data problems. We found 
errors in IPO issue dates for the majority of our sample. For example, the SDC often 
mistakenly provided announcement or subscription dates as issue dates. Over 50 percent 
of IPOs in Taiwan have this problem. To overcome this data problem, we manually 
cross-referenced each of our sample IPOs with Bloomberg to identify and correct the 
erroneous issue dates. 
5. Non-family matching firms
We also created a list of 129 non-family Taiwanese firms. Following the process devel-
oped by Kim and Ritter (1999), and Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), we identi-
fied a matching non-family firm for each family firm in our sample with comparable 
IPO date, size, and liquidity as IPOs in the most recent fiscal year. Total offer value 
captures size and cash per sales captures liquidity. The first-day IPO market capital-
ization was not used in matching because it would not be available to an investor or 
underwriter before the offering date. To choose a particular matching firm, we first 
explored the Taiwanese IPO data in SDC and stock prices in Datastream. We identified 
non-family firms sharing the same four-digit SIC code as its family firm counterpart 
and then shortened the list by excluding firms that did not go public within one year of 
the IPO date of comparable family firm3. Setting a limit to the date of IPO allowed us 
to estimate the IPO performance of non-family firms under similar market conditions. 
From these firms, REITs, closed-end funds, ADRs, and firms with share prices less than 
five dollars were excluded. This screening criterion was normally used in the extant IPO 
literature. We then searched for firms whose total offer value is between 75% and 125% 
2 Among 129 family IPOs, one of them went public in 1962, 1 in 1964, 2 in 1972, 3 in 1973, 2 in 
1976, 1 in 1977, 1 in 1983, 2 in 1987, 4 in 1988, 3 in 1989, 3 in 1990, 6 in 1991, 9 in 1992, 5 in 
1993, 8 in 1994, 5 in 1995, 9 in 1996, 6 in 1997, 10 in 1998, 9 in 1999, 10 in 2000, 6 in 2001, 16 
in 2002, 2 in 2003, 4 in 2004, and 1 IPO in 2005.
3 When we select matching non-family firms that went public within 3 years before the IPO, the results 
remain intact. We choose to apply a window of 1 year since the window of 3 years is somewhat long 
for comparable non-family IPO firm and many things can happen to market sentiment in three years.
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of the family IPO’s total offer value. If we had more than one firm left on the list of 
potential candidates, we chose the one whose cash per sales was closest to the family 
firm in the most recent fiscal year. If there was no qualified candidate, we relaxed the 
criteria to widen our search. Each family IPO got a unique non-family matching firm 
from the same industry. 
6. Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is IPO underpricing measured as the market-adjusted percent-
age return from the offer price to the closing price on the fifteenth calendar day after the 
IPO (see e.g., Loughran, Ritter, Rydqvist 1994; Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, Wilhelm 2003; 
Ritter 2003).We apply longer windows is because the price movements in the Taiwan-
ese market during the initial days of trading are restricted by exchange regulation4.The 
price of an IPO stock could continue to hit the limit several days after the IPO date as 
the equilibrium price of the stock is delayed by regulation. Computing IPO underpric-
ing using the first closing price ignores any adjustments in the market value of the IPO 
shares after the “non-hit” price is observed. 
7. Independent variables
The Percentage of outside directors is defined as number of directors who are neither 
the members of controlling family nor the management team per total number of direc-
tors. For non-family firms, it is defined as the number of directors who are not mem-
bers of management team per total number of directors. The Percentage of affiliated 
directors captures the influence of affiliated directors on the board. Because the size of 
corporate board varies, the absolute number of affiliated directors is not a very reliable 
indication of non-family director influence. Therefore, we obtained the value of this 
variable by dividing the number of affiliated directors by the total number of directors. 
The Percentage of affiliated directors2 estimates a curvilinear relationship between IPO 
underpricing and the percentage of affiliated directors on the corporate board. The Per-
centage of family ownership at IPO is measured as the percentage of shares owned by 
original family owners before the first trading date. The Percentage of insider owner-
ship at the IPO is the percentage of total shares owned by insiders of non-family IPOs. 
Lastly, following Megginson and Weiss (1991), we gauge Underwriter ranking using 
the average market share of the underwriter. Detail definitions of each variable are 
presented in the Appendix.
8. Control variables 
We draw on the extant IPO literature to include seven firm-level underpricing determi-
nants including IPO volume, Technology dummy, Log of proceeds, Firm age, Cash per 
sales, Potential successor, Year fixed effect. 
4 This argument also applies to France and Japan where “circuit breakers” are installed to limit post-
IPO daily price fluctuations within a certain preset limit.
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9. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides mean and median among all variables for family and non-family IPOs. 
We also provided p-value of t-statistics (Wilcoxon signed rank test) of mean (median) 
differences. Table 2 presents Pearson correlation coefficients among variables for family 
and non-family IPOs. The results of correlation coefficients do not show a sign of mul-
ticollinearity problem. None of the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics estimated 
in conjunction with our models exceeds 10, which is an indication of multicollinearity 
(Kutner, Nachsheim, Neter 2004).
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of IPO underpricing
There are 129 family and 129 non-family Taiwanese IPOs. Family IPOs went public during 
January 1, 1962 and December 31, 2005. The matching firm is a non-family firm that was in the 
same industry, went public within one year of the family IPO, and had comparable total offer 
value and cash per sales in its most recent fiscal year. All variables are described in the Appendix. 
White’s heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistic provides a test for the difference in means and the 











19.85 13.22 28.27 16.85 0.123 0.112
% of outside non-
family directors
53.14 51.12 72.15 89.21 0.000 0.000
% of affiliated 
directors
25.92 25.78 NA NA
% of family 
ownership at IPO
8.39 17.04 NA NA
% of insider 
ownership at IPO
NA NA 6.49 3.22
Underwriter ranking 3.91 3.71 3.38 4.98 0.131 0.090
IPO volume 38.67 38.41 46.82 46.93 0.347 0.309
Technology dummy 
(%)
30.74 29.95 20.47 16.22 0.095 0.089
Log of proceeds 14.51 15.93 18.46 17.51 0.189 0.455
Firm age (years) 7.16 2.12 1.23 0.24 0.004 0.009
Cash per sales (%) 40.22 3.76 25.68 1.04 0.008 0.064
Potential successor 
dummy (%)
16.49 13.22 NA NA
Number of IPOs 129 129
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10. Results of analysis
Table 3 illustrates regression results of underpricing on various IPO and family owner-
ship variables. Having outsider on board significantly reduces underpricing for 15-day 
returns of family and non-family firms. The effect is much higher for family firms; one 
percent increase in outside non-family directors reduces underpricing by 1.18% for fam-
ily firms but only 0.44% for non-family firms. The difference in the effect of outside 
directors on underpricing between family and non-family firms is highly significant with 
p-value of 0.002. This result supports our first hypothesis.
In addition, the percentage of affiliated directors increases underpricing. Our analysis 
shows a negative and significant relationship between underpricing and the percentage 
of affiliated directors5 thereby suggesting, as number of affiliated directors surpasses 
a certain level, the relation between underpricing and percentage of affiliated directors 
becomes negative. Taken together, the percentage of affiliated directors has an inverse 
U-shape relationship with underpricing supporting our hypothesis 1a. The expected 
percentage of family ownership at IPO is negatively related to 15-day underpricing. 
IPOs that have high level of family ownership at the IPO indicate original shareholder’s 
confidence in or commitment to the firm. Such confidence lowers the amount of market 
uncertainty and thus underpricing. This result supports our second hypothesis. As a 
comparison, we include percentage of insider ownership in non-family regression but 
its coefficient is not significant. As such, insider ownership for non-family firms does 
not indicate the same kind of commitment as for family firms.
Finally, while partnering with prestigious underwriters reduces the extent of underpric-
ing in family IPOs, partnering with highly ranked underwriter significantly increases 
the underpricing of non-family firms. The difference of underwriter ranking coefficients 
between family and non-family firms is significant at 1% with p-value of 0.002. This 
result supports the third hypothesis that underwriter reputation has a stronger impact on 
the reduction of family firm IPOs than on the non-family firm IPOs.
Overall, percentage of outside non-family director, affiliated directors, family ownership 
at the IPO, age, and cash per sales decrease underpricing whereas underwriter ranking 
and technology industry increases the family firms underpricing. For non-family firms, 
the percentage of outside directors and IPO proceeds decrease their underpricing while 
underwriter ranking and high-tech industry increase their underpricings6.
________
5 We performed a battery of sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of our findings. The results are 
available upon request.
6 In addition, we conduct robust checks and a series of sensitivity analyses to ensure that there is no 
multicollinearity and that the correct functional form was chosen (i.e., there is no redundant and/
or omitted variables). The results are quantitatively similar to the main results and available upon 
request.
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Table 3. Determinants of IPO underpricing
This table presents regressions of 15-day underpricing of 129 family and 129 non-family IPOs. 
Family IPOs went public from January 1, 1962 to December 31, 2005. The non-family IPOs are 
matching firms that went public within one year of the family’s IPO date, and had comparable 
total offer value and cash per sales in its most recent fiscal year. Descriptions of all variables are 
in the Appendix. White’s heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistic is shown under each coefficient. 
P(Diff) is the p-value from a t-test for the difference between corresponding coefficients of family 
and non-family firms. *** Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. ** Indicates statistical 















% affiliated directors 0.604***
(4.850)
% affiliated directors 2  –0.012***
( –6.445)
% of family ownership at the IPO  –0.493**
( –2.099)
% of insider ownership at the IPO 0.374
(1.248)






























Potential successor dummy  –2.849*
( –1.966)
Year fixed effect  Included Included
Adjusted R2 73.51% 21.92%
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11. The moderating effect of industry
We test Hypothesis 4, which predicts a weaker relationship hypothesized in H1-3 when 
family firms primarily operate in technology industries by including the interaction 
term between technology dummy variable and three key independent variables. Such 
as the percentage of outside directors, the percentage of family ownership at IPO, and 
underwriter ranking.  
Table 4 column 2 the coefficient of the percentage of outside non-family directors is 
significantly negative at 1% whereas the percentage outside non-family directors mul-
tiplied by technology dummy is significantly positive. The summation of these two 
coefficients suggests one percent increase in outside non-family directors of technology 
family firms decreases underpricing by 0.26% (1.02–0.76), which is significant at 5% (t-
stat is 2.105) based on Wald Test. The result supports hypothesis 4 predicting a weaker 
relationship hypothesized in H1 for technology family firm IPOs. In column 3, we added 
the interaction term for non-family firm regression. The percentage of outside directors 
and its interaction term with technology dummy variable are negatively significant at 
5%. Although the increased presence of outside directors reduces underpricing in both 
tech and non-tech non-family firms, tech firms enjoys more reduction of underpricing. 
Underwriter ranking for non-family firms has positive relationship with underpricing 
whereas it has negative relationship with underpricing of family firms.
Column 5 of Table 4 tested hypothesis 4 for the relationship hypothesized in H2. The 
results show that one percent increase in family ownership at the IPO decreases un-
derpricing by 0.11% (0.38–0.27) for technology family firm but by 0.38% for non-tech 
family firms. The result supports our hypothesis 4 in which the impact of family owner-
ship at the IPO on underpricing is weaker for family firms from technology industries. 
We performed the same test for non-family firm in column 6 by adding the interac-
tion term of technology dummy and % of insider ownership. Surprisingly, although 
insider ownership is not significant, its interaction term with technology dummy is. 
This indicates that non-family high-tech firms with high percentage of insider own-
ership are more underpriced. Finally, we compared the impact of underwriter rank-
ing on underpricing between technology and non-tech firms in columns 8 to 10. 
 Fig. 1. Extent of IPO underpricing
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Non-tech family firms benefit more from being associated with prestigious underwriters 
than tech family firms. The underpricing of non-tech family firms assisted by prestig-
ious investment bankers is reduced by 1.89% whereas the underpricing of tech family 
firms assisted by such banks is reduced only by 1.05%. Technology family firms under-
written by prestigious investment banks are able to reduce underpricing; nevertheless, 
this effect is stronger in non-tech family firms. In contrast to family firms, non-family 
technology firms associated with high ranked underwriters increase the underpricing 
by 3.48% (1.14% + 2.34%) whereas the underpricing increases by 1.14% for non-tech 
non-family firms. In sum, the impact of outside directors, family ownership at the IPO, 
and underwriter ranking on underpricing are weaker when the family firm operates in 
the technology industries. On the other hand, such impact (of outside directors, insider 
ownership, and underwriter ranking) is stronger for non-family tech firms. The results 
support the hypothesis 4. 
12. Discussion and conclusions 
Signaling help prospective investors of an IPO to better assess the legitimacy of an 
IPO firm and the value of the IPO. Using data from the Taiwan stock exchange, we 
examine the relationship between signals, governance and management practices, and 
IPO performance. The results of our analysis are in agreement with recent studies on 
the relationship between the corporate governance mechanisms and family business 
performances (Schulze et al. 2001; Anderson, Reeb 2004; Chan, Li 2008) and the re-
search on the effect of firm legitimacy in equity performances (Certo 2003; Cohen, 
Dean 2005; Bell, Moore, Al-Shammari 2008). Additionally, several important findings 
have emerged from our study.
Firstly, there is an interaction between organizational and environmental legitimacies. 
In this research, the former refers to investor acceptance associated with the governance 
and management practices of an IPO firm while the latter refers to the industry of op-
eration. Our analysis shows that the appointment of independent directors, underwriter 
reputation, and post-IPO share retaining improve the monitoring effectiveness of the 
board and the IPO performance of family firms. Our research also indicates that the 
non-family, affiliated directors affect the effectiveness of the corporate board by affect-
ing both monitoring and team performance of the board. Previous studies on legitimacy 
most focus either on the internal factors of investor acceptance (e.g. Certo 2003; Cohen, 
Dean 2005; Bell, Moore, Al-Shammari 2008) or external factors (e.g. Zuckerman 1999, 
2000). The findings reported in this paper link these two schools and suggest a modera-
tion relationship between these two sources of legitimacies. 
Secondly, we underscore the role of affiliated directors in the context of family firm 
IPO. Appointing non-family executives on the board of family business is a very com-
mon practice in public family firms and established private family firms. However there 
is very little empirical evidence about the impact of these individuals on the corporate 
board and the overall performance of the family firm. While our research only focuses 
on the context of IPO, it is likely the affiliated directors can have significant impact on 
governance effectiveness for post-IPO family firms. Future examination of the relation-
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ship between affiliated director appointment and corporate governance may also shed 
light to resolving the principal-principal agency problem in family firms.
Thirdly, this research proposes a new perspective about the uniqueness of family firms. 
Although the impact of external environment has been well studied by strategic manage-
ment and family business researchers, family business literature has been more inclined 
to focus on intrinsic uniqueness such as how a family firm reacts to external challenges. 
However it is not unusual that the label of family-owned business invokes distinctive 
perceptions for external stakeholders (Poza, Alfred, Maheshwari 1997). The results of 
our analysis show that investors react to IPO signals differently when evaluating fam-
ily firm IPO deals. It would be helpful for future researchers to identify more sources 
of such extrinsic uniqueness and the impact of these extrinsic factors on the strategy 
formulation and implementation of family firms. The results of such research would 
highlight when and how family and non-family firms adopt different strategies to ad-
dress competitive challenges. The findings of these studies would also help family firm 
managers develop effective strategies.
Although our examination of underwriter reputation’s impact on IPO performance and 
the result confirms our prediction, we are surprised by the significant positive correlation 
between underwriter reputation and the underpricing of non-family firm IPOs. There are 
two possible explanations. The first one is the asymmetry of bargaining power between 
prestigious underwriters and issuers. Highly prestigious underwriters have large market 
shares and are powerful opponents in bargaining. Hiring these high powerful underwrit-
ers is likely to cost the IPO firms more than working with a smaller underwriter. With-
out the benefit of having a prestigious underwriter to neutralize the principal-principal 
agency problem of family firms, hiring a prestigious underwriter is not likely to give a 
non-family firm much gain in its IPO. The second explanation is the cost of post-IPO 
analyst coverage. Recommendations made by star analysts of highly-ranked underwrit-
ers give legitimacy and promote a newly listed stock to the market (Zuckerman 1999). 
As such recommendations facilitate the trading and potentially drive up the trading 
prices of a new stock. Relatively unknown or young IPO firms are more likely to choose 
prestigious underwriters to receive stock coverage by star analysts. However, hiring a 
star analyst of a prestigious underwriter is costly. Underwriters are likely to set a low 
offer price for IPO equities if their clients request services of their star analysts. This 
mechanism increases the underpricing of an IPO (Cliff, Denis 2004). Since the aver-
age age of non-family firms in this study is about six years younger than the family 
firms (see Table 1), non-family firms in this study could be more motivated than family 
firms to request stock coverage by star analysts of their underwriters, thus increases 
underpricing. 
This paper has two major limitations that may suggest possible directions for future 
research. Firstly, the concept of family has been evolving in the second half of the 20th 
century. Investors’ perception toward family firms in 1962 (the earliest family firm IPO 
in this study) may not be the same as in the year 2005 (the latest family firm IPO in 
this study). Future research to track the differences of investor perception toward family 
firms over time will allow us to differentiate the influence of perceptual differences on 
the effects of family firm legitimacy and reputation over time.
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Secondly, testing our hypotheses using data collected from one country helps us control 
the variance in the perceived legitimacy of family firms and institutional factors across 
countries but the results may not be generalized to other countries with different institu-
tions. Bertrand and Schoar (2006) propose that the relationship between societal family 
values and economic development is different across economies. In most industrialized 
economies, the strong family values at the society level are likely to have a negative 
effect on economic growth, yet such relationship is positive in developing economies. 
These authors argue that the absence of well-developed financial and legal institutions in 
the developing economies may have encouraged family involvement in entrepreneurial 
activities to minimize business risk, while entrepreneurs’ families have less contribu-
tion to lessen risk associated with institutional environmental uncertainty in developed 
economies. As the data of this research is collected from one country, we are not able 
to examine the influence of family values in our central research theme. Future multi-
national research analyzing the impact of family values could extend and complement 
the findings from our research.
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APPENDIX
Definitions of Pre-IPO Variables
Panel A: Independent Variables
Variables Source Definition
% of outside 
directors
TEJ Percentage of number of non-family outside directors by total 
number of directors; outside directors are directors, who are not 
in the management team.
% of affiliated 
directors
TEJ Percentage of numbers of non-family inside directors by total 
number of directors; inside directors are directors, who are in 
the management team.
% of family 
ownership 
at IPO
TEJ Percentage of total shares owned by members of a family before 
the first trading day.
% of insider 
ownership 
at IPO
 TEJ The percentage of total shares owned by insiders of non-family 
IPOs. Insiders include top-five executive officers, directors, and 




SDC We calculated Loughran and Ritter (2004)’s adjusted Carter-
Manaster underwriter reputation ranking. First, we followed the 
approach developed by Carter and Manaster (1990) to rate under-
writer prestige. The Carter and Manaster measure was construct-
ed from the placements of IPO underwriters in the prospectus, 
which lists all the investment banking firms that comprise the 
underwriting syndicate of an IPO issue with more prestigious 
underwriters listed higher. This measure, however, is limited to 
U.S. underwriters. Following the idea that more prestigious in-
vestment banks generally underwrite more IPOs, most of which 
tend to be larger offerings, we constructed a discrete measure of 
underwriter ranking from 0 (least prestigious) to 9 (most pres-
tigious) by classifying each lead investment bank for our sample 
IPOs into one of 10 categories according to the global proceeds 
of the IPOs the investment bank underwrote during our 1962–
2005 sample period. Specifically, we assign a discrete integer to 
each lead underwriter as follows: 9 if its global proceeds are no 
less than $20 billion; 8 if global proceeds are between $10 and 
$20 billion; 7 if global proceeds are between $5 and $10 billion; 
6 if global proceeds are between $2 and $5 billion; 5 if global 
proceeds are between $1 and $2 billion; 4 if global proceeds are 
between $0.5 and $1 billion; 3 if global proceeds are between 
$0.2 and $0.5 billion; 2 if global proceeds are between $0.1 and 
$0.2 billion; 1 if global proceeds are below $0.1 billion; and 0 if 
the lead underwriter is not ranked among the top 500 by the SDC. 






Cumulative abnormal return from the offering day until fifteenth 
day after the IPO adjusted by market return.
IPO volume SDC The total number of domestic IPOs issued over the 12-month 
period ending in the month in which the IPO was issued.





SDC It is equal to one if the company belongs to the high and medi-
um-high technology sectors, and zero if it was in the medium-
low and low technology groups. Sectors were grouped according 
to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) classification of three-digit SIC code according to their 
R&D intensity (Cucculelli, Micucci 2008).
Log 
of proceeds 
SDC Natural logarithms of the money raised, after fees and expenses 
or natural logged shares offered in IPO multiplied by offer price 
after fees and expenses.
Firm age SDC and 
company’s 
website
Number of years since the firm was founded before the IPO. 
We hand-filled gaps in SDC’s coverage of company founding 
dates, and manually checked all firms that according to SDC 
were zero to three years old at the time of their IPO, because 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) note that SDC frequently reports the 
most recent incorporation date rather than the founding date. A 
detailed discussion of some of the errors in the SDC database can 
be found on Alexander Ljungqvist’s website at http://pages.stern.
nyu.edu/~aljungqvist.htm.




The amount of cash and equivalents in the most recent fiscal 
year before the firm going public divided by sales; all financial 




 TEJ Coded 1 if at least one family member from the younger genera-
tion or a founder’s sibling is placed in the corporate board or is 
a member of top management team.
Note: TEJ stands for Taiwan Economic Journal.
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